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LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
THE CPLR AT FIFTY: A VIEW FROM
ACADEMIA
Vincent C. Alexander*
My guess is that most of the distinguished guests in this audi-
ence, and certainly those on the panel, believe that rules of civil prac-
tice and procedure such as those embodied in New York's Civil
Practice Law and Rules-the CPLR-can and should play a central
role in the administration of justice. But lest we assume the universal-
ity of this belief, let me share with you a contrasting view expressed
by Benjamin N. Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, in his 1928 commencement address to the first graduating
class of St. John's University School of Law. In exhorting the gradu-
ates to devote themselves to the noble, even spiritual, ideals of justice,
he cautioned them, "You will need to know much more than the pif-
fle-paffle of procedure."' The "piffle-paffle" of procedure? Having de-
voted the last 36 years of my professional life to the teaching of
procedural "piffle-paffle," I was utterly deflated when I first came
upon this line from the Judge's speech. Cardozo was speaking, I hope,
with tongue in cheek. While the primary focus of civil dispute resolu-
tion must be the substantive law, the "piffle-paffle" of procedure is the
only means of implementing it.2
My role this evening is to reflect upon the CPLR from the view-
point of those of us who use it in our law school teaching as the cen-
terpiece of the course commonly called New York Practice. I will do
so from the three perspectives that govern the life of a legal academic:
classroom teaching, legal scholarship, and service to the legal
community.
* Charles M. Sparacio Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. I
wish to thank the following colleagues for their comments and suggestions in the
preparation of my remarks: At St. John's Law School, Professor Edward D. Cava-
naugh and Vice Dean Emeritus Andrew J. Simons; and on the Advisory Committee
on Civil Practice, Chair George F. Carpinello, Esq., and members Thomas F. Gleason,
Esq., and Professor Patrick M. Connors.
1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Our Lady of the Common Law, 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
231, 241 (1939).
2. See Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & John Leubsdorf, CivII PRO-
CEDURE 2 (5th ed. 2001).
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I.
CLASSROOM TEACHING
First and foremost, teaching students in an advanced civil proce-
dure course that concentrates on the CPLR helps them prepare for
civil litigation in all of the state courts of New York. As we all know,
New York has numerous civil courts of original subject matter juris-
diction-a distressing feature for students and litigants alike.3 What is
sometimes overlooked, however, is that the CPLR governs the proce-
dure in all of those courts unless some specific statute says otherwise.4
Even for students who intend to practice law in other states, an in-
depth study of the CPLR will enhance their ability to cope with com-
plicated procedural issues, regardless of the applicable code.
Furthermore, an analysis of the CPLR indirectly gives students a
deeper understanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
code that is presented to them in their first-year civil procedure course
as the ideal. Students in a CPLR course have an opportunity to com-
pare and evaluate solutions to procedural issues that may be quite dif-
ferent from the Federal Rules. Although many CPLR provisions, by
design, are identical in substance to the Federal Rules,5 the CPLR has
a fair number of eccentricities. For example, when studying the CPLR,
students must consider whether the ability to commence an action in
New York with only a summons and sparsely-worded "notice," rather
than a summons and complaint, still makes sense in the word-process-
ing age.6 Does the New York pleading standard in CPLR 3013, in
effect, mirror that of the current federal standard imposed by
Twombly?7 What is the continuing utility of verifying a pleading if a
3. The New York trial courts having civil jurisdiction are the Supreme Court, the
County Courts, the New York City Civil Court, the District Courts (Nassau and Suf-
folk Counties only), City Courts outside New York City, the Justice Courts, the Fam-
ily Court, the Court of Claims, and the Surrogate's Court.
4. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 101 (McKinney 2013).
5. See Jack B. Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60
COLuM. L. Riw. 50, 55 (1960).
6. See CPLR 305(b); David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, C3012:1, in CPLR
3012; Adolf Homburger & Joseph Laufer, Appearance and Jurisdictional Motions in
New York, 14 Bure. L. REv. 374, 393-95 (1964). If acting under time pressure, it
should be easy enough for a plaintiffs attorney to generate a passable barebones com-
plaint that can be readily amended later pursuant to CPLR 3025(a)-(b).
7. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see CPLR 3013 (in addi-
tion to giving notice of the transaction or occurrence sued upon, plaintiff must also
give notice of "the material elements of each cause of action or defense"); Edward D.
Cavanagh, The Impact of Twombly on Antitrust Actions Brought in the State Courts,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2013, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
source/1 3/02/Feb l 3-Cavanagh.
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lawyer's signature certifies the pleading is non-frivolous? 8 What is the
value today in having bills of particulars as well as interrogatories? 9
Are there no compulsory counterclaims under the CPLR?' 0 Is any
valid purpose served by the cumbersome "demand" prerequisite to a
motion to change venue?" Why should depositions of nonparty wit-
nesses and the adversary's expert witnesses be essentially off-limits? 1 2
In light of the delays and costs involved, what justifies New York's
liberal policy in taking interlocutory appeals?13 Through a process of
comparative analysis, the dedicated student will complete the CPLR
course with a deeper understanding of both the CPLR and the Federal
Rules. The student who masters the CPLR will be well positioned to
maneuver through the procedural thickets that lurk both in New York
and other jurisdictions.
A CPLR course also enables students to reflect upon the entire
breadth of New York civil substantive law. Most students taking the
New York practice course are seniors, and the course offers a useful
capstone to their study of the substantive law. Many of the Court of
8. CPLR 3020-23 (verification of pleadings); N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGs. tit.
22, § 130-L la (West 2013) (attorney for party must sign all papers, thereby certifying
absence of frivolous content and purpose). See CPLR 105(u) (verified pleading may
be used as affidavit); CPLR 3215(f) (verified complaint may be used as proof of claim
for entry of default judgment).
9. See CPLR 3041-3044 (bills of particulars); CPLR 3130-3133 (interrogatories);
Joseph M. McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 15 SYR. L. Riv. 381, 383-84 (1964); Wein-
stein, supra note 5, at 71-72. See generally Kenneth P. Taube, Note, Limiting the
Scope of Litigation: Bills of Particulars, Interrogatories, and Requests for Admission
in Illinois and Federal Courts, 1979 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 211.
10. CPLR 3011 ("An answer may include a counterclaim against a plaintiff .... .");
see also CPLR 3019(a). See Henry Modell & Co. v. Minister, Elders & Deacons of
the Reformed Dutch Church of the City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 978, 981 (N.Y.
1986) (noting that although New York has no compulsory counterclaim rule, resjudi-
cata principles will preclude an unsuccessful defendant from later asserting a factu-
ally related claim seeking relief that would be inconsistent with a judgment awarded
to the plaintiff in the prior action).
11. CPLR 511(a)-(b). Cardozo's "piffle-paffle" terminology aptly describes the
convoluted demand procedure. See, e.g., HVT, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908
N.Y.S.2d 222 (App. Div. 2010).
12. CPLR 3101(a)(4); Kooper v. Kooper, 901 N.Y.S.2d 312 (App. Div. 2010) (pre-
cluding deposition of non-party witness unless the information sought is not available
from other sources). See also CPLR 3101(d)(1)(iii) (no deposition allowed of oppos-
ing party's expert witness except upon a showing of special circumstances).
13. CPLR 5701(a)(2)(iv)-(v) (allowing appeal as of right from Supreme Court to
Appellate Division from any order that "involves some part of the merits" or "affects
a substantial right"). See The Chief Judge's Task Force on Commercial Litigation in
the 21st Century, Report and Recommendations to the Chief Judge of the State of
New York 21 (June 2012) ("The liberal availability of interlocutory appeals from
Commercial Division rulings is rare among competitor courts [in other states] and is
generally considered by practitioners to be beneficial.").
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Appeals decisions contained in Professor Oscar G. Chase's authorita-
tive casebook14 arise in a context that facilitates a quick review of
major substantive concepts. For example, in Lacks v. Lacks'5 (subject
matter jurisdiction in general), Kagen v. Kagen' 6 (subject matter juris-
diction of the Supreme Court and Family Court), and Carr v. Carr17
(in rem jurisdiction), students get a snapshot of important principles of
New York domestic relations law. Cases on the statute of limitations
span the broad field of tort law, including modern problems of prod-
ucts liability' 8 and medical malpractice,19 as well as property law, 20
estate law, 2 1 and general contract law.2 2 Many of the cases on personal
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and venue touch upon issues of
agency, partnership and corporate law. 2 3 Important principles of in-
demnity and contribution are embodied in cases on third-party prac-
tice, especially the landmark decision of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. 2 4
Statutes and cases on provisional remedies introduce the student to
creditors' rights2 5 and often serve to reinforce their understanding of
the principles of equity. 2 6 The motions to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action 27 and for summary judgment 28 inherently implicate the
substantive law. A good example is Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye's deci-
sion in Weissman v. Sinorm Deli, Inc.2 9 In the context of explaining
the unavailability of CPLR 3213's hybrid action/motion for summary
14. OSCAR G. CHASE & RonERT A. BARKER, Civii LITIGATION IN NEW YORK (5th
ed. 2007).
15. 359 N.E.2d 384 (N.Y. 1976).
16. 236 N.E.2d 475 (N.Y. 1968).
17. 385 N.E.2d 1234 (N.Y. 1978).
18. E.g., Blanco v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 689 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1997).
19. E.g., LaBarbera v. New York Eye and Ear Infirmary, 691 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y.
1998); Nykorchuck v. Henriques, 577 N.E.2d 1026 (N.Y. 1991).
20. E.g., Buran v. Coupal, 661 N.E.2d 978 (N.Y. 1995).
21. E.g., Caffaro v. Trayna, 319 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1974).
22. E.g., Global Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 715 N.E.2d 482 (N.Y. 1999).
23. E.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998);
Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 278 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1972); Hart v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 517 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Div. 1987).
24. 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972). See Richard T. Farrell & Diane S. Wilner, Dole v.
Dow Chemical Co.: A Leading Decision-But Where?, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 330 (1972).
25. E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 62 (McKinney 2013) (attachment); ABKCO Indus.,
Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 1976) (attachable property).
26. E.g., Credit Agricole Indosuez v. Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank, 729 N.E.2d 683
(N.Y. 2000) (injunction).
27. CPLR 3211(a)(7). See, e.g., Foley v. D'Agostino, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (App. Div.
1964) (claim for breach of fiduciary duties).
28. CPLR 3212, 3213. See, e.g., Ugarizza v. Schmieder, 386 N.E.2d 1324 (N.Y.
1979) (negligence).
29. 669 N.E.2d 242 (N.Y. 1996).
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judgment in the case at hand, the reader benefits from a very helpful
summary of the law of commercial paper.
Teaching New York Practice also allows the professor to help
students refine their skills of statutory interpretation. The operation of
the CPLR's two main statutes on personal jurisdiction, CPLR 301 and
302, illustrate this point. CPLR 301 states simply that "a court may
exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property or status as might
have been exercised heretofore." This was an ingenious mechanism
for codifying New York's traditional bases of general personal juris-
diction, such as presence, doing business and domicile within the
state. The "heretofore" to which CPLR 301 refers, of course, is the
totality of the jurisdiction law that existed prior to September 1, 1963,
the CPLR's effective date. CPLR 302, in contrast, introduced long-
arm jurisdiction to New York, with a list of specific categories of New
York-related activity that would subject a nondomiciliary defendant to
personal jurisdiction despite the defendant's lack of a New York pres-
ence or its functional equivalent. 30
One of the intriguing questions raised by CPLR 301 is whether
the statute's "heretofore" language was intended to restrict the doing-
business basis of jurisdiction to those circumstances that were recog-
nized by the courts as of August 31, 1963. Under pre-CPLR law, the
doing-business basis of jurisdiction-general jurisdiction based on
systematic and sustained business activity in New York-could be ap-
plied only to corporate defendants, not individuals. 31 Does this mean,
today, that a sole proprietor or some other unincorporated organization
from another state that opens up a business in New York cannot be
served outside New York and subjected to New York jurisdiction for
claims that arose elsewhere? Students are asked to ponder a split on
this issue in the Appellate Division, which has never been settled in all
these years by the Court of Appeals. 32
Along the same lines, the doing-business cases prior to 1963
seemingly required the maintenance of an office or physical plant in
30. When CPLR 302 first took effect in 1963, it contained three bases for the asser-
tion of long-arm jurisdiction: claims arising from a transaction business in New York,
a tortious act in New York, or the ownership, use or possession of real property in
New York. Over the years, the Legislature has added new categories of New York
contacts that may subject a party to long-arm jurisdiction. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 40-41.
31. See Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, C301:10, in CPLR 301.
32. Compare ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Lennon, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781 (App. Div. 1976)
(allowing doing business jurisdiction over individual), with Nilsa B.B. v. Clyde
Blackwell H., 445 N.Y.S.2d 579 (App. Div. 1981) (rejecting extension of doing-
business jurisdiction over individual).
[Vol. 16:643668
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New York 33 or the continuous presence of employees engaging in
sales activity on behalf of the out-of-state employer. 34 The ability to
conduct long-range business via the internet and other electronic
modes of communication was unheard of in 1963. Should it not be
possible under CPLR 301, in appropriate circumstances, to reach a
finding that an out-of-state defendant who has engaged in such sus-
tained New York business via electronic means can be subject to gen-
eral personal jurisdiction in New York? Chief Judge Kaye suggested
this possibility in a footnote in Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. v. Mon-
tana Board of Investors,35 a case better known for its application of
the long-arm statute to a New York-directed transaction conducted by
means of an instant messaging service. Inasmuch as the courts created
the doing business basis of jurisdiction in the first place, can it fairly
be denied that CPLR 301 leaves courts free to expand the doctrine to
encompass contemporary circumstances in accordance with common
law tradition?
The evolution of CPLR 302, the long-arm statute, gives students
a particularly vivid picture of the interplay between legislative action
and that of the courts. One of the earliest major CPLR cases decided
by the Court of Appeals was Feathers v. McLucas,36 where the 302
category of jurisdiction over claims arising from the commission of a
tortious act within the state was interpreted narrowly to apply only to
the situation in which a tortfeasor's conduct, such as negligent manu-
facturing, transpired in New York. It was not enough that the
tortfeasor's out-of-state negligent conduct resulted in injury within the
state. Despite recognizing that such an assertion of jurisdiction would
be constitutional in many circumstances, the court ruled that the Leg-
islature simply did not intend such an application of long-arm jurisdic-
tion. The court rejected an opposite interpretation reached by the
Illinois Supreme Court under a similarly worded statute,37 and also
rejected the statement of the Advisory Committee, as well as the ex-
plicit writings of then-Professor and Committee Reporter, now Judge,
Jack B. Weinstein, 38 that the statute was intended to give litigants the
ability "to take full advantage of the state's constitutional power over
33. See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917).
34. See, e.g., Benware v. Acme Chem. Co., 135 N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div. 1954).
35. 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 n.2 (N.Y. 2006).
36. 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965) (Feathers was one of three cases consolidated for
appeal; the first case name in the court's opinion is Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v.
Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.).
37. Gray v. Amer. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (111. 1961).
38. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 66.
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persons and things."39 The Legislature responded shortly thereafter by
amending the statute to allow jurisdiction over claims arising from the
defendant's commission of a tortious act outside the state causing in-
jury within the state provided certain additional affiliating connections
exist between the defendant and the state of New York.40 One might
assume that the Legislature was indicating-after the fact-that it
agreed with the view that the individual categories of New York activ-
ity listed in the statute should be interpreted liberally and with a view
toward facilitating the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction.
The same pattern-strict judicial construction followed by a
broadening of the statute through legislative amendment-has been
seen in judicial interpretations of the long-arm category of "transac-
tion of business in New York." 4 1 Ironically, the Court of Appeals'
cautious approach to long-arm jurisdiction starkly contrasted with its
wildly expansive application of quasi in rem attachment jurisdiction in
Seider v. Roth,42 which ultimately met its constitutional demise in the
39. N.Y. Av. COMM. ON PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SEcONo PRELIMINARY REPORT,
LEGIS. DEC. No. 13, at 37 (1958).
40. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3) (McKinney 2013).
41. In McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 229 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 1967), and
Kramer v. Vogel, 215 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1966), the court held that the "mere ship-
ment" of goods to New York was not a transaction of business in New York. These
cases were overruled by a 1979 amendment to CPLR 302(a)(1) that provides for juris-
diction for a claim arising from a contract to supply goods or services in New York.
More recently, the court declined to apply the transaction-of-business-in-New-York
category to a foreign litigant who wrongfully procured a defamation judgment in En-
gland against a New York author, seeking to enjoin her New York publication activ-
ity. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 882 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007). The Legislature
overruled this decision with the adoption of CPLR 302(d).
In contrast to the foregoing cases, Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256
N.E.2d 506 (N.Y.1970), was an early decision giving a broad reading to the transac-
tion-of-business-in-New-York category with respect to a California art collector who
participated in a New York auction by telephone from California. But see M. Katz &
Son Billiard Products, Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc., 232 N.E.2d 864 (1967) (re-
jecting jurisdiction over out-of-state buyer who placed one telephone order for goods
from New York seller).
42. 216 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1966) (allowing quasi in rem jurisdiction over out-of-
state defendant in case involving out-of-state automobile accident based on attach-
ment of liability policy issued to defendant by insurer that did business in New York).
The Court of Appeals is generally creditor-friendly when it comes to localizing the
situs of property or garnishees in New York. See, e.g., Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v.
Falor, 926 N.E.2d 1202 (N.Y. 2010); Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 911 N.E.2d
825 (N.Y. 2009); ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y.
1976). But see Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia Ins. Co., 2012 WL 919664 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (New York courts treat each branch of a bank as a separate entity for purposes
of property attachment).
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U.S. Supreme Court.43 Disagreement persists over the appropriate
reach of the New York long-arm statute.44
The analysis of these and so many other cases involving the tug
and pull between the Legislature and the courts45 sharpens the stu-
dents' knowledge of legislation and statutory interpretation.
II.
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Turning to scholarship-the duty and delight of a law school pro-
fessor-the CPLR has provided a springboard for the writing of nu-
merous books, articles and commentaries. One of the first and ever-
timely such endeavors was the multi-volume treatise on New York
Practice by then-Professor Weinstein and Professors Harold L. Korn
and Arthur R. Miller.46 It is still the premier authority to which I send
students and practicing lawyers when they seek elucidation on the
thorniest issues that arise under the CPLR. A two-volume CPLR Man-
ual, originally authored by Professor Oscar G. Chase of N.Y.U. and
now by David L. Ferstendig, Esq., builds upon the Weinstein, Korn
and Miller tradition. 47 Professor David D. Siegel's hornbook on the
CPLR, now in its fifth edition, is an eloquent, one-of-a-kind book
written by a law professor who has devoted the lion's share of his
academic career to analyzing, criticizing and tracking the development
of the CPLR and its many amendments. 4 8
A unique form of academic scholarship is the authorship of
casebooks for use in the classroom. Those of us who teach the CPLR
have been blessed with two such books. In the early days, there was
43. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
44. Compare Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a
Multinational World Communicating by Extraterrestrial Satellites, 37 WHLAMETTE
L. REV. 145, 146-51 (2001) (urging broader interpretation of CPLR 302), with New
York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 146-52 (2d Cir. 2011) (Wesley, J.,
concurring) (questioning Judge Weinstein's expansive application of CPLR
302(a)(3)(ii) in case against out-of-state gun retailers).
45. Studying the New York statute of limitations on medical malpractice, for exam-
ple, gives the student a good look at judicial efforts to apply legislative policy. See
CHASE & BARKER, supra note 14, at 296-307. See also id. at 279-96 (products
liability).
46. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, HAROLD L. KORN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, NEW YORK
CiviL PRACTICE (David L. Ferstendig ed., 2d ed. 2013).
47. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, HAROLD L. KORN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CPLR MANUAL
(David L. Ferstendig ed., 3d ed. 2013).
48. DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE (5th ed. 2011). Since April 1993, Pro-
fessor Siegel has also published a monthly report, now online, called "Siegel's Prac-
tice Review," which summarizes and analyzes current developments in New York
civil practice.
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the detailed and citation-rich New York Practice casebook by Profes-
sor Herbert Peterfreund of N.Y.U. and then-Dean, now Judge, Joseph
M. McLaughlin of Fordham. 4 9 When these two distinguished mem-
bers of the New York legal academy took their casebook off the mar-
ket, Professor Chase, later joined by Professor Robert A. Barker of
Albany, followed in their footsteps with Civil Litigation in New
York. 50 Chase and Barker's streamlined casebook on the subject has
become the gold standard for teaching the CPLR in law school.
Others of us have written Practice Commentaries on the CPLR
for McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated.5' In per-
forming this undertaking, I, like the courts, examine the reports of the
original Advisory Committee as well as the notes of the various com-
mittees, commissions, and bar associations that have successfully pre-
vailed upon the Legislature to make changes to the CPLR over the
years. In some instances, I have stumbled upon some gems of legisla-
tive intent that would have aided judicial analysis. For example, in
George Cohen Agency, Inc. & Donald S. Perlman Agency, Inc.,52 the
Court of Appeals wrote at length on the purpose and intended scope of
CPLR 1007, a provision for impleader (third-party practice). The issue
was whether a defendant, having satisfied the criteria for impleading a
third-party defendant, i.e., showing that the third-party defendant may
be liable "for all or part" of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff,
could seek additional damages above and beyond the claim-over lia-
bility. The court drew upon general principles of modem procedure
that encourage the joinder of all relevant parties so as to achieve, when
feasible and fair, an all-encompassing resolution of a dispute. The
court then persuasively concluded that CPLR 1007 merely prescribes
the threshold test for impleader and does not preclude the addition of
other claims once the basic requirement is met. The court's opinion
would have been bolstered by a citation to the Advisory Committee's
Notes on CPLR 601-allowing for unlimited joinder of multiple
claims-where the Committee wrote that the term "plaintiff' in that
statute was intended to include "third-party plaintiff."53
49. HERBERT PETERFREUND & JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, NEW YORK PRACTICE:
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS (1978 ed.).
50. CHASE & BARKER, supra note 14.
51. The principal authors of the Practice Commentaries currently are Professors
David D. Siegel, Patrick M. Connors, and Vincent C. Alexander. My predecessor as
an author of the Practice Commentaries was then-Dean, now Judge, Joseph M.
McLaughlin.
52. 414 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1980).
53. N.Y. SEN. FIN. COMMITTEE ET AL., FIFTH PRELIMINARY REPORT, LEGIs. Doc.
No. 15, at 299 (1961).
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On another occasion, the Court of Appeals apparently overlooked
the Advisory Committee's explanation of the meaning of "prima facie
evidence" as set forth in CPLR Article 45's evidence provisions. The
court took the position that the term "prima facie evidence," when set
forth in a CPLR statute, creates only a permissive inference, not a
presumption, that some other fact exists, imposing no burden of rebut-
tal on the other side.5 4 The Advisory Committee, however, was clear
in stating that prima facie evidence, as used in CPLR Article 45, cre-
ates a presumption that casts upon the opponent the burden of coming
forward with contrary evidence, in the absence of which the party who
introduces prima facie evidence is entitled to a ruling in its favor on
the relevant point.55 In a later case involving a non-CPLR statute, the
court held that prima facie evidence does indeed have a genuinely
presumptive effect. 5 6
Empirical research offers another opportunity for scholarship.
When the CPLR was being debated, some members of the Columbia
Law School faculty encouraged the conducting of field research to test
the validity of some of the foundations upon which various CPLR
provisions were premised.57 A potential model for such empirical
work was Columbia Professor Maurice Rosenberg's study of the ef-
fect of mandatory pretrial conferences on the quality, efficiency and
outcome of personal injury litigation in New Jersey, one of the first
leading empirical studies of civil procedure.58 Regrettably, few empir-
ical studies have focused specifically on New York procedure. Field
research is expensive and time-consuming and not always effective in
persuading rule-makers or decision-makers of the value of reform.
Nevertheless, inspired by the proponents of such scholarship, I under-
54. Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De G., 460 N.E.2d 681, 682 (N.Y.
1983) (examining N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518(c) (McKinney 2013) hospital records hearsay
exception). See also People v. Mertz, 497 N.E.2d 657, 658 (N.Y. 1986) (examining
CPLR 4518(c), government records hearsay exception). Mertz, it should be noted,
was a criminal case in which the treatment of prima facie evidence as a permissive
inference was consistent with constitutional considerations.
55. N.Y. ADV. COMM. ON PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT,
LEGIs. Doc. No. 13, at 267 (1958). In addition to CPLR 4518(c), other provisions of
CPLR Article 45 confer the status of "prima facie evidence" on certain facts contained
in specified documents. See, e.g., CPLR 4520 (certificate of public officer); CPLR
4538 (authenticity of acknowledged document). See also N.Y. BANKING LAW
§ 675(b) (McKinney 2013) (opening of bank account in joint names is "prima facie
evidence" of intent to create joint tenancy).
56. Powers v. Powers, 653 N.E.2d 1154, 1157-58 (N.Y. 1995) (examining N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 454(3)(a)).
57. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 64-66, 80-86.
58. Maurice Rosenberg, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE: A
CONTROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION (1964).
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took an empirical study for my doctoral thesis at Columbia Law
School. My topic was the attorney-client privilege, a subject encom-
passed by CPLR 4503, and my particular inquiry was the effect, in
practice, of the attorney-client privilege on communications between
corporate executives and the attorneys for their corporate employers.59
It was my great good fortune to have Judge Weinstein, at that point a
member the adjunct faculty at Columbia, serve as my dissertation
adviser.
Based on the findings of the study, I made a proposal for restrict-
ing the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate con-
text,6 0 and an intermediate appellate court in Arizona actually adopted
the proposal, only to be promptly reversed by the Arizona Supreme
Court.6 1 Other data reported in the study had a more favorable recep-
tion in the U.S. Supreme Court, where the Court cited some of the
study's findings as tending to support application of the privilege in
the very different context of counseling individual clients.62
I am not aware of any empirical studies on specific provisions of
the CPLR, although Professor Chase analyzed statistics in a 1988 arti-
cle-his inspiration was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the CPLR-
showing that delays in the administration of civil justice in New York
were probably about the same both before and after adoption of the
CPLR.6 3 Indeed, most of the field research on civil procedure has fo-
cused on the issues of litigation delay and cost.6 4
59. Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the
Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 191 (1989) (interview survey of 102 corporate
attorneys and 52 corporate executives). The study was designed to evaluate the effect
of the corporate attorney-client privilege in general, not specifically under CPLR
4503.
60. Id. at 368-413. A more recent empirical study on the conduct of corporate
attorneys, focusing on their involvement in public relations aspects of legal controver-
sies, is reported in Michele DeStafano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public
Opinion, Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1259 (2009).
61. Samaritan Foundation v. Goldfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993), vacating in part
844 P.2d 593 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
62. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 n.4 (1998).
63. Oscar G. Chase, The Paradox of Procedural Reform, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
453, 471-73 (1988). Professor Jay C. Carlisle analyzes the potential delay-reducing
impact of CPLR 3031-17 in Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Dis-
putes Under New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 95 (1988).
64. See generally CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 679, 680 (ed. Peter Cane & Herbert M.
Kritzer 2010); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation
Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 992-95 (2003) (review of empiri-
cal research showing that claims about the magnitude of civil litigation are over-
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III.
SERVICE TO THE LEGAL COMMUNITY
The third area of endeavor for a law professor is service to the
legal community. For many years, members of the legal academy have
been active participants in law reform efforts. The CPLR itself re-
sulted from the diligent and painstaking work of then-Professor Wein-
stein and other members of the Columbia faculty, joined by professors
from other law schools and members of the practicing bar. The tradi-
tion of academic involvement with the CPLR continues. The current
CPLR Advisory Committee, which reports to the Chief Administrative
Judge of the Courts, is composed not only of practicing attorneys, re-
tired judges, court clerks, and court attorneys, but also two full-time
law professors, 65 two former professors, 66 and at least two who serve
as adjunct professors.67 This committee
annually recommends to the Chief Administrative Judge legislative
proposals in the area of civil procedure that may be incorporated in
the Chief Administrative Judge's legislative program. The Commit-
tee makes its recommendations on the basis of its own studies, ex-
amination of decisional law, and recommendations received from
bench and bar. The Committee maintains a liaison with the New
York State Judicial Conference, committees of judges and commit-
tees of bar associations, legislative committees, and such agencies
as the Law Revision Commission. In addition to recommending
measures for inclusion in the Chief Administrative Judge's legisla-
tive program, the Committee reviews and comments on other pend-
ing legislative measures concerning civil procedure.68
Each year, the Committee typically generates several well-con-
sidered proposals for amendments to the CPLR and other procedure-
related statutes. For the year 2013, for example, the Committee has
stated); Danya Schocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform:
Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1102-16 (2012) (review of empiri-
cal research undermining the popular belief that civil litigation, particularly discovery,
takes too long and is too expensive).
65. The author of these remarks (St. John's) and Professor Patrick M. Connors
(Albany).
66. Professor David D. Siegel (first at St. John's and later at Albany) and George F.
Carpinello (formerly at Albany).
67. Thomas F. Gleason (Albany) and Burton N. Lipshie (Cardozo).
68. N.Y. ADvISORY COMM. ON CIvIL PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE AuvISORY COM-
MITTEE ON CIvIL PRACTICE TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF
THE STATE OF NEw YORK 6 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Adv. Comm. Rep.], available at
http://courts.state.ny.us/ip/judiciaryslegislative/pdfs/2013/201 3-CivilPractice-ADV-
Report.pdf.
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recommended a total of twenty-nine legislative changes to the
CPLR.69
Unfortunately, few, if any, of the Advisory Committee's twenty-
nine proposed changes to the CPLR are likely to be enacted in 2013 or
thereafter. The Legislature has sole control over changes to the CPLR
and, in recent years, has shown little interest in procedural reform.70 It
is unknown whether the Legislature has been unimpressed with the
recent proposals or simply preoccupied with more urgent business.
Bar associations and others may, of course, make their own legislative
recommendations, and some worthy ones have recently been
adopted. 71
Legislative control over practice and procedure in the courts is a
longstanding tradition in New York, enshrined in the constitution. 72
For a few years after the CPLR took effect, however, both the consti-
tution and implementing legislation authorized the Judicial Confer-
ence, a statutorily defined group of judges headed by the Chief
69. Fifteen inactive proposals were also continued from years past, including a rec-
ommendation to repeal the so-called "Dead Man's Statute" (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4519 (Mc-
Kinney 2013)). See 2013 Adv. Comm. Rep., supra note 68, at 154-85. In addition,
the Committee's recommendations for 2013 include the adoption of seven amend-
ments to certain procedure-related administrative regulations of the Chief Administra-
tive Judge. See infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
70. In 2012, none of the Committee's twenty-four proposals to amend the CPLR
were enacted into law. In 2011, only six out of twenty-five proposals were enacted, in
2010 the number of enactments was three out of twenty, and in 2009 only two out of
nineteen made it into the CPLR. See 2013 Adv. Comm. Rep.; N.Y. ADVISORY COMM.
ON CivIL PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITEEE ON CIVIL PRACTICE TO
THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(2012); N.Y. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE ADVISoRY COM-
MITTEE ON CIVIL PRACTICE TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2011); N.Y. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL PRACTICE, RE-
PORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL PRACTICE TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2010); N.Y. ADVISORY
COMM. ON CIVIL PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL PRAC-
TICE TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK (2009). Proposals not adopted in a given year are typically carried over to
subsequent years.
71. See, e.g., Exempt Income Protection Act, 2008 N.Y. LAWS ch. 575, which
amended several provisions of CPLR Article 52 in order to enhance the ability of low-
income judgment debtors to protect their exempt assets from improper enforcement
restraints, executions and levies. See generally Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 855 F.Supp.2d
157, 166-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
72. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 30; Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 250 N.E.2d 690,
697 (N.Y. 1969) (noting that the New York Constitution gives the Legislature control
over the CPLR even though "[w]e may, as students of the judicial process, strongly
favor having the court invested with the power to regulate procedure and to promul-
gate rules bearing thereon").
THE CPLR AT FIFTY
Judge,73 to adopt and amend, subject to legislative veto, those provi-
sions of the CPLR referred to as "Rules" (indicated by the prefix "R")
as compared to "sections" (indicated by the prefix "§").74 The desig-
nations of some CPLR provisions as Rules (subject to change by the
Judicial Conference) as compared to sections (legislative action only)
sometimes seemed arbitrary, despite the explanation that sections rep-
resented fundamental policy while Rules were of lesser import.75 The
Judicial Conference was aided in its rule-making activity by an advi-
sory group of legal scholars and practitioners. 76 Although the courts
did not have carte blanche to amend any and all provisions of the
CPLR, they at least had some ability to make changes. This all came
to an end in 1978, when, as a result of a constitutional amendment, the
Judicial Conference's rule-making authority was rescinded.77 Since
then, the Legislature has been the sole gatekeeper of the CPLR. The
Chief Administrative Judge, on behalf of the courts and with the assis-
tance of an advisory committee, can recommend, but cannot imple-
ment, change.7 8
Nevertheless, the Chief Administrative Judge, on behalf of the
courts, has been given some authority by the constitution and statute,
to adopt, without prior legislative approval, administrative regulations
on practice and procedure provided they are not inconsistent with ex-
isting law.7 9 It is through this mechanism that the Uniform Civil Rules
for the Supreme Court and the County Court were adopted, providing
procedural detail to fill gaps in the CPLR on such matters as motion
practice and pretrial conferences.80 Similarly, it was the Chief Admin-
istrative Judge's rule-making authority that produced regulatory provi-
73. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 214(1) (McKinney 2013).
74. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 46, at 102.01.
75. See Samuel M. Hesson, The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, 27 ALB.
L. REV. 175, 175 (1963); Weinstein, supra note 5, at 52. Why is it, for example, that
summary judgment, which can foreclose a litigant's day in court, should be designated
a Rule (see CPLR 3212), whereas the requirement for verification of pleadings is
designated a section (see CPLR 3020)?
76. PETERFREUND & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 49, at 8.
77. See 1986 REP. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, reprinted in 2 N.Y. SESS. LAWS
2425, 2746-50 (McKinney).
78. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 212(1)(g); N.Y. JuD. LAW § (1)(q).
79. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 30; N.Y. JuD. LAW § 211(1)(b); § 212(2)(d). See A.G.
Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 503 N.E.2d 681, 684 (N.Y. 1986) ("Generally,...
the Legislature has the power to prescribe rules of practice governing court proceed-
ings, and any rules the courts adopt must be consistent with existing legislation and
may be subsequently abrogated by statute.").
80. N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 202.1-202.70 (West 2013). Section
202.1(d) states that the Uniform Rules "shall be construed consistent with the Civil
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), and matters not covered by these provisions shall be
governed by the CPLR."
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sions on sanctions for frivolous litigation conduct,81 attorney
certification of litigation papers,8 2 attorney conduct during deposi-
tions, 83 and an entirely separate subset of rules for the litigation of
commercial cases in the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court. 84
These additional rules have been beneficial. Indeed, the rules' provi-
sions for sanctions and attorney certifications of papers fill holes that
were left open when the Legislature first rejected some of the original
Advisory Committee's proposals for inclusion in the CPLR. 5
The current rulemaking authority of the Chief Administrative
Judge, however, may be a mixed blessing. While it allows for the
making of some interstitial improvements in practice and procedure,
the creation of additional rules external to the CPLR forces attorneys
and judges to search yet another source when seeking the answer to a
procedural problem. It has always been necessary to consult caselaw
construing the CPLR, but now the practitioner must also look into
whether a matter of procedure not mentioned in the CPLR might be
covered in the Uniform Civil Rules, some particular Part of the Chief
Administrative Judge's rules, local district rules, or individual judges'
rules. 8 6
The inability of the courts directly to amend New York's rules of
practice and procedure has long been lamented by commentators and
the courts.87 The Legislature, of course, should play a significant over-
sight role in making improvements in procedure because the legisla-
tive ranks contain many lawyers and friends of lawyers who will have
constructive ideas about practice and procedure.88 But surely legisla-
tive involvement, as in many other states and under federal law, 89 can
be effective by way of veto and independent legislation. The courts
81. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 130-1.1, 130-1.2-130.1.5. The regu-
latory sanctions, adopted in 1989, are much broader in scope than the statutory provi-
sion for sanctions in tort actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8303-a (McKinney 2013), which was
added by the Legislature in 1985 and amended in 1986.
82. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-Lla.
83. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 221.1-221.3. See Patrick M. Con-
nors, Practice Commentaries, C3115:1 (Supp. 2006 & 2013 Cum. Pocket Part), in
CPLR 3115 (analyzing the deposition conduct rules and their consistency with the
CPLR).
84. N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.70.
85. See N.Y. SEN. FIN. COMM., SixTH REPORT, LEGIs. Doc. No. 8, at 30 (1962).
86. See, e.g., III & 111-A McKinney's New York Rules of Court-Local Civil (2013).
87. See, e.g., Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 250 N.E.2d 690, 697 (N.Y. 1969);
Thomas Shaw, Procedural Reform and the Rule-Making Power in New York, 24
FORDHAM L. REV. 338 (1955).
88. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 52.
89. See Judith Resnik, PROCESSES OF THE LAW: UNDERSTANDING COURTS AND
THEIR ALTERNATIVES 132-140 (2004).
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themselves, with the counsel of an active advisory committee and the
additional input of bar associations and other interested parties, are the
bodies most acutely aware of contemporary procedural problems and
the means of solving them. If compromise is needed, a careful re-
working of the CPLR's sections (legislative change only) and rules
(court-initiated change with legislative veto) could be adopted.
In conclusion, it is the opinion of this professor, who teaches the
CPLR, writes about it, and participates in efforts for its improvement,
that the CPLR has served the bench and bar of New York quite effec-
tively for the past fifty years. It carries forward New York traditions
that apparently are near and dear to the hearts of New York judges and
attorneys, and there is value in that.90 It is a testament to the CPLR's
durability that, unlike the pre-1963 era of New York history, there
have been no periodic and widespread calls for the overhaul of the
New York procedure code. 91 The CPLR may have some quirks, but on
the whole, it is a coherent code of procedure that is not mere "piffle-
paffle." The CPLR gives New York litigants a fair and reasonable
means of having their disputes resolved on the merits. Such is the
purpose of procedure.
90. Jack B. Weinstein & Jonathan B. Wiener, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking Facts:
Brief Reflections on Magistrates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 429, 441 (1988) ("any procedural system, if it is to work effectively,
must be adapted to local institutions and attitudes"). See also Weinstein, supra note 5,
at 53.
91. See Chase, supra note 63, at 454 (observing that New York's Field Code,
adopted in 1848, was replaced in 1880 by the Code of Civil Procedure (the "Throop
Code"), which was revised in 1920 as the Civil Practice Act, which the CPLR re-
placed in 1963, thus constituting a roughly 40-year cycle of major recodifications of
New York civil procedure law).
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